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INTRODUCTION
The goal of this study is to provide a comprehensive overview of the market access provisions applicable to trade in goods contained in RTAs notified to the WTO and in force. A previous study conducted by the WTO in 2002 surveyed the market access provisions applicable in merchandise trade for RTAs in force at that time.
2 Since then the number of RTAs has grown considerably. As of November 2010, nearly 200 RTAs containing provisions on trade in goods have been notified to the WTO and are currently in force.
3 Of these, 124 RTAs -more than 60% -were notified to the WTO in the period since 2002.
Over the last ten years, membership in RTAs has become more geographically diverse and involves a broad cross-section of WTO Members; all but one of the WTO's Members are engaged in RTAs of one type or another. Another major change in the last decade is the increasing participation of Asian countries ̶ ̶ previously reliant for the most part on multilateral liberalization ̶ ̶ in RTAs both within Asia and further afield. Cross-regional RTAs, as opposed to the more traditional form of regional integration among neighbouring countries, are increasingly the norm. North-South and South-South RTAs feature more prominently among the RTAs in force today than they did a decade ago. All of these factors point to the need to analyse the market access provisions contained in the current generation of RTAs in order to identify trends and determine areas worthy of future study.
Scope of the Study
The focus of this study is all RTAs of a reciprocal nature covering trade in goods, notified to the WTO and in force as of November 2010. Unilateral preferences such as those granted under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) or under a WTO waiver are not taken into account. A number of issues of relevance to market access in trade in goods are studied. First, an indication of the complexity of WTO Members' preferential trading regimes is provided by calculating for each WTO Member its participation in RTAs and the potential number of bilateral preferential relationships that result. Second, the importance of preferential trade is quantified using as a proxy the share of total imports and exports accounted for in trade with preferential partners.
The scope and depth of trade and tariff liberalization is measured (in selected RTAs) by calculating the percentages of trade and tariffs liberalized at the entry into force and at the end of implementation period. Calculations are performed at the HS 6-digit level (rather than the national tariff-line level) as this provides a uniform measure for comparison across RTAs. 4 Agricultural goods, often shielded from liberalization even in a preferential context, are given special focus. Products excluded from liberalization are analysed by measuring the frequency of exclusion across HS Chapters. The evolution of trade flows over a ten year period between selected RTA partners is also measured. Relative margins of preference are calculated for those RTAs for which detailed tariff liberalization schedules are not available.
The structure and length of the transition period granted by RTA parties to implement tariff concessions provides an insight into the speed of liberalization undertaken and eventual asymmetry in the design of liberalization commitments. Finally, other regulatory aspects which have a bearing on market access are explored. These include rendezvous clauses which commit parties to undertake Page 6 and Southern Africa, the CIS, East and West Asia -due to overlapping membership in RTAs, which occurs when a country has preferential trading relations with a given partner under two (or more) RTAs.
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In Chart 1 and Annex Table A1 , EU(27) is counted as one member. If EU Members are counted individually, the average figures for Europe more than double to 21 RTAs per country on average (for 41 European countries in total), and 32 RTA partners. Source: WTO Secretariat.
Note: The figure in parentheses (after the region) indicates the number of countries in the sample.
C. QUANTIFYING PREFERENTIAL TRADE
Quantifying trade that takes place under reciprocal preferential regimes is fraught with difficulty. Few countries capture preference utilization data (or make it publicly available), thus making it difficult to determine if trade actually takes place under preferential regimes. Studies have shown that exporters do not always take advantage of preferences for reasons which include insufficient knowledge on the part of the exporter, and the need to comply with complicated rules of origin which undermine any advantage conferred by the preference (particularly when preferential margins are low). 12 In addition, trade which takes place at zero MFN rates is not, by definition, preferential. Another complicating factor is that some developing countries may have access to developed markets under non-reciprocal preferential regimes, such as GSP, in addition to access under an RTA.
In the absence of widely available preference utilization data, an indication of the importance of preferential trade can be obtained by measuring for each WTO Member (and non-WTO Member involved in RTAs notified to the WTO) the percentage of imports and exports sourced from or destined to preferential partners, relative to global trading capacity. 13 The reference year is 2008 or 11 In such cases, the partner is counted only once. 12 The Asian "Noodle Bowl": Is it Serious for Business?, Masahiro Kawai and Ganeshan Wignaraja, ADB Institute, 2009 . 13 The figures take account of RTAs notified to the WTO and RTAs under the LAIA framework (not otherwise notified to the WTO).
the last year for which data is available.
14 Only reciprocal preferential relationships are taken into account: preferential relationships resulting from unilateral preferential regimes are not.
The measurement is, however, not an indication of the amount of trade actually conducted under preferential regimes. Bearing in mind that few RTAs liberalize all tariff lines, that liberalization is often implemented over a (lengthy) transition period, that trade which takes place at zero MFN rates is not by nature preferential, and that countries may, when faced with stringent rules of origin, choose to forego the preferential rate on offer in favour of the MFN rate, the figures showing trade conducted with preferential partners will tend to overstate the percentage of trade actually conducted on preferential terms. On the other hand, given the hundred or so RTAs in force but not ( or not yet) notified to the WTO, for some countries (particularly developing countries party to such RTAs) the figures presented may understate the amount of trade conducted with preferential partners. 15 Despite these caveats, the figures provide an indication of the importance of preferential trade for WTO Members.
Another element to note is that for some developing countries, a sizable percentage of their exports may qualify for preferential treatment under unilateral preferential regimes granted by developed countries. Thus, it should not be assumed that any developing country exports which are not destined to trading partners under RTAs are subject to MFN rules. Likewise for developed countries which grant unilateral preferences, imports not sourced from trading partners under reciprocal RTAs are not necessarily subject to MFN rules.
Detailed results showing trade conducted with preferential RTA partners are shown in Annex Table  A1 . Chart 2 summarizes the results and shows the average percentages of trade with RTA partners (to and from all geographic regions) for RTAs notified to the WTO, broken down into the eleven regions previously defined. 16 Countries in Central America have on average the highest percentage of trade with preferential partners (54% of imports and 76% of exports), followed by those in Africa, North America and Europe. For South America, the addition of the RTAs signed under the LAIA framework (but which have not been notified individually to the WTO), adds on average another 10% of trade from preferential partners. For Europe, only trade for EU(27) with third parties is included.
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With an average of less than five RTAs per country and nine preferential trading partners (the lowend of those observed in Chart 1), Central American countries nonetheless have the highest percentage of trade recorded with preferential partners, thus demonstrating the need, when determining the importance of RTAs for a given country, to consider not only the number of RTAs and bilateral trading relationships that result, but whether such RTAs are signed with major trading partners. 18 In some regions -Africa, East Asia and Oceania -low levels of trade are recorded for some countries from their preferential partners, while for others -Europe and North America in particular -even the low outliers show much higher levels. Unsurprisingly, those countries which are active RTA players -Chile, Mexico, and Singapore -are those that record the highest percentages of trade with preferential partners. 21 The shares of their global trade with 18 other RTA partners are small, in almost all cases accounting for less than 1%. Declining trade shares over the period are evident with some partners, in particular Israel, Croatia, and Canada, while for others modest increases are recorded.
The EU has the largest sample size (28 RTAs) and the RTAs of longest vintage, though with the exception of trade with Switzerland, Norway and Turkey (which account in 2009 for 7.1%, 4.6% and 3.5% of its global trade, respectively), the shares with other partners are small accounting for 1% or less of its global trade. Over the period analysed, the EU's share of global exports destined for preferential partners increased modestly with most RTA partners (exceptions are Iceland, Andorra, Israel, Mexico, CARIFORUM states and Côte d'Ivoire), while its share of global imports sourced from RTA partners also increased with the majority of its preferential trade partners (except Syria, Faroe Islands, South Africa, Morocco, Israel, Jordan, Algeria and Cameroon).
India's trade with its RTA partners is dominated by its membership in APTA and trade with ASEAN countries which account in 2009 for 12.5% and 9.7% of its global trade, respectively. Shares of its global exports increased to all but three of its RTA partners over the period analysed, most strikingly in the case of APTA, Singapore, ASEAN and Korea, where shares are double or nearly so. 22 In terms of share of global imports sourced from RTA partners, those from APTA and Korea increased the most over the period studied, while those from Singapore, SAFTA and Nepal declined.
Japan's trade with ASEAN countries accounts in 2009 for 14% of its global trade, while trade with partners outside the region averages 1% or less. The share of its global imports sourced from RTA partners has declined in six of its 11 RTAs and for exports in four of its RTAs.
23 Japan has bilateral 26 Results based on calculation at the HS 6-digit level may differ from those at the 24 Only ad valorem duties are taken into account. 25 For instance, Turkey's national tariff schedule is defined at the 12 digit level and is composed of over 19,000 lines while Norway's is defined at the 8 digit level and has just over 7,000 tariff lines. 26 For the purpose of this study, an HS 6-digit line is only considered liberalized if all its sub-lines are completely liberalized, the strictest measure that can be applied. Other methods of summing at the six digit level, e.g. averaging, or considering an HS 6-digit line liberalized if half or more of its sub-lines are liberalized would yield different results.
Page 11 national tariff-line level depending on the structure of a country's tariff schedule and the tariff concessions granted.
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Charts 3-8 show liberalization measured by the share of tariff lines and intra-RTA imports (based on the three year average preceding the RTA's year of entry into force) at the entry into force and end of implementation for the 65 RTAs (comprising 162 tariff schedules) included in the sample. As can be seen in Chart 3, some RTAs provide for full liberalization of tariffs on entry into force of the RTA, while others start with a lower level of liberalization.
28 By the end of the implementation period, a dense cluster in the top right corner of the Chart indicates liberalization of 85% or higher of tariffs and trade, though a few outliers liberalize substantially less (Chart 4). The picture is more nuanced, however, if the liberalization of agricultural and non-agricultural goods is considered separately. Charts 5 and 6 show a breakdown of the share of tariff lines and intra-RTA imports liberalized at entry into force and at the end of the implementation period for non-agricultural products (WTO definition). By the end of the implementation period most RTAs in the sample liberalize more than 90% of tariffs and trade, as shown by the clustering effect at the top right hand corner of Chart 6.
The FTA between Japan and Mexico shown in Table 2 is used to illustrate this point. In this example, Japan's liberalization under the FTA is higher when calculated at the HS-6 digit level, whereas for Mexico calculation at the national tariff line level yields a higher result. Source: WTO Secretariat. 28 The sample includes countries such as Singapore with a high share of MFN duty-free tariff lines. In the case of agricultural goods, however, a broader range of liberalization strategies is evident. On entry into force of the RTAs surveyed, considerably less liberalization takes place (Chart 7), and by the end of the implementation period a lower outcome is evident (Chart 8). This confirms the longstanding observation that greater sensitivities in agriculture impede liberalization under RTAs with outcomes falling considerably short of that achieved for industrial products. 
Liberalization of agricultural products
In order to explore further the liberalization of tariffs on agricultural products, we analyse the individual tariff concessions granted in the same 65 RTAs (162 tariff schedules in total), by calculating the percentages of MFN duty free lines, tariff lines liberalized at entry into force and at the end of the implementation period, and lines excluded from liberalization. 29 Results are shown in Charts 9-12 for each bilateral relationship grouped by geographical region -Africa and the Middle East, Americas, Asia and Oceania, and Europe and the CIS countries. 30 For example, in Chart 9, Egypt-Switzerland shows the liberalization of agricultural lines offered by Egypt to its partner Switzerland (under the EFTA-Egypt FTA). The corresponding concessions offered by Switzerland to Egypt (Switzerland-Egypt) are shown in Chart 12, Europe and CIS.
In Africa and the Middle East (a total of 15 bilateral tariff schedules, plus the SACU customs union), the level of MFN duty-free tariffs on agricultural products is quite varied. For the SACU countries, Page 13 more than 40% of agricultural tariff lines are duty-free on an MFN basis, more than double that of most other countries in the sample, such as Egypt (13%), Tunisia (5%) and Morocco (0%). By the end of the implementation period, significant liberalization is evident in four of the 16 tariff schedules analysed (Egypt-EU, Morocco-US, SACU and Jordan-Singapore). Liberalization is low, however, in the case of Egypt's and Tunisia's RTAs with EFTA partners and with Turkey where less than 15% of tariff lines on agricultural products are liberalized by the end of the implementation period in the bilateral tariff concessions analysed (Chart 9).
Also evident is the disparity of liberalization granted by some countries. Morocco, for example, liberalizes less than 20% of agricultural tariff lines at the end of the implementation period in its RTA with Turkey, but more than 90% in its RTA with the United States. Likewise, Egypt liberalizes 13% of agricultural tariffs with the EFTA States but more than 90% in its RTA with the EU. In the Americas (44 bilateral tariff schedules analysed), Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Honduras have no agricultural tariff lines duty-free on an MFN basis (Chart 10). For others, the percentage of MFN duty-free lines ranges from 2% (Mexico) to 49% (Canada). By the end of the transition period, liberalization of agricultural products is, on the whole, quite high, with the exception of a few outliers: more than 80% of agricultural tariff lines are liberalized in more than 75% of the schedules analysed for this region. Disparities in liberalization commitments are again evident for certain countries. For instance, Canada has a higher ambition in its RTA with Peru where more than 90% of agricultural tariff lines are liberalized at the end of the liberalization period, compared to its RTA with EFTA where it liberalizes less than 60% with Switzerland and Norway and 80% with Iceland. Chile's RTAs (for which the sample size is greatest) show even greater disparities in liberalization: in its RTA with India, no agricultural tariff lines are liberalized, with the EFTA countries it liberalizes on average 25%, whereas with Australia, Brunei, China, Colombia, New Zealand, Panama, and Singapore it liberalizes more than 97%. Likewise, Mexico liberalizes more than 80% of its agricultural tariff lines in five of its six RTAs, but less than 50% in its RTA with Japan.
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Another observation is that countries which start out with high percentages of MFN-duty free lines do not necessarily achieve a higher outcome by the end of the RTA's implementation period. Canada, with the highest percentage of MFN duty-free lines in the Americas, achieves a lower outcome on average than most developing countries in the sample which have lower percentages of MFN dutyfree lines and therefore liberalized considerably more. In the case of the United States, although the percentage of duty-free lines in its RTAs is high at the end-point, it is less than that achieved by some developing countries such as Peru and Chile in some of their RTAs.
Chart 10 In Asia and Oceania (for which the sample size is greatest with 54 tariff schedules), again there is a mixed picture regarding MFN duty-free lines: Brunei and Singapore (with no agricultural sector to In Europe and the CIS countries (49 tariff schedules analysed), liberalization of agricultural goods is lower on the whole than that in other regions (Chart 12). By the end of the implementation period, only about a third of the schedules analysed show liberalization of more than 80%. Switzerland liberalizes less than 40% of its agricultural tariff lines in all seven RTAs analysed and Norway only slightly more. Turkey has liberalized less than 20% of agricultural tariff lines in six of its seven RTAs, and less than 40% in its RTA with Georgia. Again, disparities are evident. Ukraine has liberalized more than 90% of its agricultural tariff lines in all its RTAs except that with FYROM in which it has liberalized less than 20%. Albania has liberalized more than 70% of its agricultural tariff lines with the EU, but less than 20% in its RTA with Turkey. Likewise, Serbia has liberalized more than 80% of its agricultural tariff lines with the EU, but less than 5% in its RTA with Turkey.
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Chart 11: Asia and Oceania -Liberalization of tariff lines (agricultural goods)
Chinese Taipei-Panama India-Chile* India-Singapore Indonesia-Japan Japan-Brunei Japan-Chile Japan-Indonesia Japan-Malaysia Japan-Mexico Japan-Philippines Japan-Switzerland Japan-Thailand Japan-Viet Nam Charts 9-12 demonstrate the variance of liberalization strategies applied to agricultural products in RTAs across the regions for the sample analysed (which is about a third of all RTAs in goods notified to the WTO). Obviously a larger sample size would enable clearer patterns to be drawn as some countries, though active RTA players, are underrepresented in the sample. This analysis could be complemented as more RTAs are subject to the WTO's Transparency Mechanism.
The degree of liberalization in agricultural products does not seem to be determined by a country's status as either developed or developing; in some North-South RTAs, developing countries liberalize considerably more agricultural tariff lines than developed countries, despite having a lower percentage of duty-free MFN lines initially. 31 Some countries appear to engage in the systematic protection of the agricultural sector regardless of their trading partner's comparative advantage. This seems to be the case for the EFTA countries, Japan, Korea and Turkey which might -potentially -limit their future RTA partners to countries which are not major agricultural producers or those willing to accept a lower level of market access in agricultural products. Alternatively, these countries may be required to liberalize more in order to strike a deal with some partners. 32 For others, such as Chile and Mexico, the picture is more nuanced, with high level outcomes achieved when negotiating with some trading partners and lower levels in others, indicating that a low level of ambition may be a negotiated (and reciprocated) outcome, depending on the negotiating interests of the RTA parties involved.
Nor is it evident that ambition is determined by the legal cover used by WTO Members to notify their RTAs. RTAs covering trade in goods among developed countries or between a developed and developing country fall under GATT Article XXIV, while those among developing countries can be notified under either GATT Article XXIV or the Enabling Clause. Indeed, many developing countries, particularly in Latin America and Asia have opted to notify their RTAs under the more stringent conditions of GATT Article XXIV rather than use the Enabling Clause. Those RTAs notified under the Enabling Clause are identified by an asterisk in Charts 9-12. Although the sample size is small (4 RTAs and eight bilateral tariff schedules), the outcomes are clearly different. In two RTAs (Chile-India and Egypt-Turkey), the ambition to liberalize is clearly absent: Turkey liberalizes 0.6% of its agricultural tariff lines, while Chile, India, and Egypt liberalize none. In the other two RTAs (Pakistan-Malaysia and Pakistan-Sri Lanka) the objective is clearly more ambitious: by the end of the implementation period, liberalization of agricultural tariff lines ranges from 66% to 96.1%, above that achieved under a number of RTAs notified under GATT Article XXIV.
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Nor is there evidence in the sample to suggest that complementarities in agriculture are being exploited, i.e. that RTA partners with different growing seasons are accorded greater market access than partners located in the same hemisphere. For instance, Japan accords no greater market access in agricultural products to Chile than to its other RTA partners, nor do the EFTA countries accord greater market access to Chile or SACU than to other RTA partners. Obviously with a larger sample size this observation could be explored in more detail.
The focus in this section has been on tariff lines fully liberalized under an RTA. It should be noted, however, that other forms of market access liberalization such as duty reduction (as opposed to elimination), and tariff rate quotas may provide increased market access opportunities.
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Tariff-rate quotas are used in a number of RTAs, in general in addition to those offered by a WTO Member in the WTO. Sensitive agricultural products such as beef, chicken, pork, vegetables, fruits, sugar and dairy products are frequently the target, though some industrial products such as iron and steel, wool and certain textile products are subject to TRQs. The design of TRQs varies considerably; some are clearly more trade liberalizing than others. For instance, the in-quota quantity may be fixed, progressively increase, or be subject to review or consultations at a later stage, while the in-quota duty may be zero or set at a fixed or declining percentage of the MFN rate. The out-of-quota duty may be set as the MFN rate or a declining percentage thereof. In many RTAs, TRQs are phased out and removed by the end of the transition period; in others, they remain in place. Table 3 provides an overview of the various liberalization modalities seen in RTAs. A case-by-case study would be necessary in order to measure their degree of trade liberalization or restrictiveness. 31 For example, Japan's RTAs with Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand and Viet Nam. 32 For instance Korea liberalizes 96.6% of agricultural tariff lines in its recent RTA with the EU (WTO document WT/REG296/1/Rev.1) 33 Indeed, Pakistan liberalizes 66% of its agricultural tariff lines in its RTA with Malaysia, 91% with Sri Lanka (both notified under the Enabling Clause), and 29% with China (notified under GATT Article XXIV). 34 The impact of reductions of duties can be captured by looking at margins of preference. show the number of tariff schedules in which one or more products are excluded from liberalization at the end of the implementation period, by HS chapter. Thus, for HS Chapter 1, almost 50% of the 162 tariff schedules analysed exclude one or more product(s). In 16 HS Chapters, more than half the tariff schedules analysed exclude one or more products from liberalization. HS Chapters subject to the most frequent exclusions from liberalization are Chapters 17 (sugar), 21 (miscellaneous edible preparations), 22 (beverages), 10 (cereals), 4 (dairy products), and 2 (meat). 
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HS Chapters 1-24
Source: WTO Secretariat.
For industrial products (HS Chapters 25-97), exclusions from liberalization are less frequent. Products in HS Chapter 35 (albuminoidal substances) -most of which are classified as agricultural products in the WTO definition -are the most frequently excluded (in more than 40% of the tariff schedules analysed), followed by Chapters 29 (organic chemicals), 38 (miscellaneous chemical products), 33 (essential oils), 87 (vehicles) and 25 (salt). A further analysis of product exclusions can be drawn by looking at exceptions to full liberalization of agricultural products on an HS Chapter basis, horizontally across selected RTAs, particularly those in which disparities in the provision of agricultural concessions are evident. Table 4 shows the results for Canada, Chile, China, Korea, Mexico, Pakistan, Switzerland and Turkey (using the 3-letter ISO country code for each bilateral relationship).
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For Canada (four tariff schedules analysed), HS Chapters 1 (live animals), 2 (meat), 4 (dairy produce), 15 (animal and vegetable fats), 16 (preparations of meat and fish), 17 (sugar), 18 (cocoa), 19 (preparations of cereals), 21 (miscellaneous edible preparations), 22 (beverages, spirits and vinegar), and 23 (residues and waste) are subject to exclusions across all its RTA partners.
For Chile (13 tariff schedules), no single HS Chapter is subject to exclusion across all the RTA partners analysed, though HS Chapters 10 (cereals), 11 (products of the milling industry), 17 (sugar) and 21 (miscellaneous edible preparations) are subject to exclusions across most. With India there are exclusions across all HS Chapters 1-24, and for Japan in all but five. In its RTA with EFTA, all but one HS Chapter (3, fish) has product exclusions in the case of Switzerland and Norway, and seven Chapters in the case of Iceland (which may reflect Iceland's more limited agricultural export potential).
For China (4 schedules), four HS Chapters, 10 (cereals), 11 (products of the milling industry), 15 (animal and vegetable fats) and 17 (sugar) are subject to product exclusions across all four RTAs. All 35 These countries were selected given the asymmetries in treatment across a number of RTAs.
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HS Chapters 1-24 are subject to product exclusions in its RTA with Pakistan, and ten in the case of Peru.
For Korea (5 schedules), there are product exclusions across all HS Chapters 1-24 in its RTAs with Singapore and the EFTA states. In its RTA with Chile, three HS chapters are fully liberalized.
For Mexico (6 schedules), HS Chapters 8 (edible fruit and nuts), 9 (coffee, tea), 17 (sugar), 21 (preparations of vegetables) are subject to product exclusions across all its RTAs. With neighbouring Central American countries, product exclusions with regard to El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras are for the most part spread across the same HS chapters, while Costa Rica and Nicaragua are subject to fewer product exclusions.
For Pakistan (3 schedules), HS Chapters 4 (dairy produce), 9 (coffee, tea), 14 (vegetable plaiting materials), 15 (animal and vegetable fats), 21 (preparations of vegetables), 22 (beverages, spirits and vinegar), and 24 (tobacco) are subject to product exclusions across all HS Chapters. In its RTA with China, all HS Chapters are subject to exclusions.
For Switzerland (7 schedules), only four HS Chapters -3 (fish), 9 (coffee, tea), 13 (lac, gums and resins), and 14 (vegetable plaiting materials) are not subject to product exclusions. The remaining 20 HS Chapters are subject to product exclusions across all RTA partners analysed.
Likewise for Turkey (7 schedules), only three HS Chapters -5 (products of animal origin), 13 (lac, gums and resins), 14 (vegetable plaiting materials) are not subject to product exclusions. The remaining 21 HS Chapters are subject to product exclusions across all RTA partners analysed.
This subset demonstrates the considerable asymmetries in treatment across RTAs for the eight countries in the sample. Again results would seem to point to a negotiated outcome rather than a negotiating partner's comparative advantage in agriculture. Systematic protection of goods in some HS Chapters is in evidence, particularly Chapters 10, 17 and 21, which are subject to exclusions across the majority of RTAs studied. 
G. ANALYSIS OF MFN VERSUS REMAINING DUTIABLE PREFERENTIAL RATES
In this Section we compare MFN versus dutiable preferential rates on those products still subject to duties at the end of the implementation period in those HS Chapters subject to the most frequent exclusions in a subset of tariff schedules. 36 These are Chapter 2 (meat and edible meat offal), 4 (dairy produce), 7 (edible vegetables), 10 (cereals), 15 (animal or vegetable fats and oils), 16 (preparations of meat and fish), 17 (sugars), 21 (miscellaneous edible preparations), and 22 (beverages, spirits and vinegars). A summary shows that reductions in preferential rates have been made most often in HS Chapters 21 and 16, while in HS Chapters 10, 15 and 22 tariff reductions have been made in only a few schedules suggesting little progress in the liberalization of these products even in a preferential context (Table 5) . Detailed results are shown in Annex Charts A1-A9 using the 3-letter ISO country codes for each bilateral relationship. For each bilateral relationship, the relative margins of preference are calculated for all goods, agricultural, and non-agricultural goods (WTO definition) at the latest year for which data are available. 38 Results are summarized at the country level by taking an average across the RTAs used in the calculation for each country represented (Table 7) .
Data presented here is a snapshot of liberalization at a given point in time (2010 or 2011 in most cases). Given that many RTAs included in the sample are relatively recent, the implementation period may not yet be finished. We would expect therefore that the relative margins of preference to increase over time once the RTAs are fully implemented.
For some countries, RMPs are uniformly high: Singapore, New Zealand, Chile, the United States and Australia all show a relative margin of preference of above 90% in all products, based on the sample. For others, such as the EU, Mexico, Oman, Iceland, Israel, FYROM, Canada, Croatia, and Norway, liberalization of above 90% in non-agricultural products is accompanied by lower (or slower) liberalization in agricultural products, thus resulting in lower overall liberalization. For some developing and transition economies, the relative margin of preference is low for all products, which may result from recent entry into force of the RTAs in the sample or limited ambition. In 47% of 192 RTAs a degree of asymmetry is evident with one (or more) partner(s) being granted longer to implement concessions that the other(s). Although developing country members of the RTA typically benefit from a longer transition period, this is not always the case. Of the 192 RTAs analysed, six contain provisions allowing the developed partner a longer transition period to implement tariff liberalization commitments than its developing country partner.
The link between the length of the transition period and the degree of liberalization is explored for the 65 RTAs that have been subject to the Transparency Mechanism (Chart 16). Again, the implementation period used is that of the slowest liberalizing partner. Of the 65 RTAs, eight have no transition period while two have transition periods above 20 years; slightly more than half have a transition period longer than ten years. The percentage of tariff lines liberalized is an average of all parties to each RTA. In the sample analysed, for WTO non-agricultural products, a longer transition period results in a higher percentage of tariff lines liberalized. For agricultural products, if RTAs Page 25 which liberalize using a big-bang approach are put aside, again we see that a longer transition period results in a higher percentage of tariff lines. A larger sample size would allow us to draw firmer conclusions.
Chart 16 WTO Non-agricultural Prods.
Note:
The figure in parenthesis after the transition period indicates the number of RTAs in each group.
J. MULTILATERALIZATION OF MARKET ACCESS COMMITMENTS
Much has been written about the potential for RTAs to contribute to liberalization at the multilateral level, thus reducing the inherent discrimination that liberalization on a preferential basis entails. The extension of RTA-negotiated market access and the reduction of MFN rates would reduce discrimination against non-RTA members and promote the global public good. A convincing argument is made by Hoekman that encouraging non-discriminatory liberalization, particularly in the case of North-South RTAs, would reduce the extent of discrimination against third parties which are often developing countries. 39 His proposal (which he concedes would only be feasible for newly formed RTAs, given that full liberalization is often not the objective of existing RTAs) is that the developed country would liberalize all its trade while its developing country partner would commit to lesser liberalization, but on an MFN basis, thus reducing the potential for trade diversion, lowering administration costs and benefitting the WTO membership at large.
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In this study we look at two areas relevant to market access in trade in goods where multilateralization of preferences might occur: (1) MFN-type provisions in RTAs; and (2) third country accession to existing RTAs.
MFN-Type Provisions in RTAs
MFN-type clauses which provide for the extension to RTA parties of more favourable treatment granted to other parties within a plurilateral RTA or to third parties, are a common feature in trade in services, but less common in RTAs containing provisions on trade in goods. This may be due to the Page 26 fact that there is less scope to differentiate preferential regulatory treatment granted in the context of trade in services to preferential partners (and thus an incentive to harmonize preferential treatment), whereas in merchandise trade countries can accord differing tariff treatment depending upon the import source (assuming they have the resources and capacity to administer multiple tariff schedules).
Clearly, there is a difference between the MFN provision in GATT Article I which has universal application among WTO Members (unless subject to permitted exceptions), and an RTA-specific MFN-type clause, which reserves subsequent liberalization to the parties (or a subset of parties) involved in the RTA, but not to the wider WTO Membership. For the RTA parties, such a clause is an avenue to promote further liberalization, while entrenching discrimination towards third parties.
In some cases, MFN-type clauses in RTAs covering trade in goods apply solely to intra-trade (only the case for RTAs involving three or more parties) or in relation to trade with third parties. Such clauses are rarely unconditional, but are frequently subject to conditions which restrict their scope and application, by, for example, limiting the scope to certain products or to agreements subsequently negotiated with certain parties. There is often a degree of asymmetry in that not all parties may provide more favourable treatment or only certain parties benefit from it.
MFN-type provisions on trade in goods limited to intra-trade among the parties were found in four RTAs (Table 8) . A third-party MFN-type clause was found in 44 of the 192 RTAs studied. In five RTAs, the provision of more favourable treatment is unconditional (though in the case of COMESA, subject to reciprocity); in others, it is subject to conditions or restrictions, such as certain goods or third parties, with application limited to certain RTA parties. In some cases, the parties agree to negotiate to decide whether more favourable treatment is to be granted. The 44 RTAs containing third-party MFN-type clauses are broad in geographical scope. The EU's economic partnership agreements (with Cameroon, CARIFORUM and Côte d'Ivoire) contain such a clause (limited in the case of the ACP partner to RTAs signed with major trading partners). Many of EFTA's RTAs contain MFN-type provisions, but they are heterogeneous in scope: in some, more favourable treatment is granted only by the EFTA states (in processed agricultural products covered under the Agreement); in others, only the partner grants more favourable treatment (usually in industrial products) and in two (with Turkey and Singapore) all parties grant more favourable treatment (for EFTA-Turkey only on processed agricultural goods). Intra-trade only. The acceleration or improvement of tariff commitments on trade in goods between two or more parties is to be extended to all parties.
ASEAN -China (G)
Intra-trade only. All commitments undertaken by each Party shall be applied to all the other Parties.
ASEAN -India
Intra-trade only. Applies to all originating goods.
ASEAN -Japan
Intra-trade only. Applies to all goods.
Chile -Costa Rica
Marks of origin, products subject to price bands
Chile -El Salvador
Marks of origin, products subject to price bands COMESA Unconditional application, all goods, "on a reciprocal basis" ECOWAS Unconditional application LAIA Upon negotiation, goods covered by other partial agreements 
EU -Cameroon
Post signature, the EU grants any more favourable treatment applied in EIAs. Cameroon grants any more favourable treatment with "any major trading partner".
EU -CARIFORUM
Post signature, the EU grants any more favourable treatment applied in FTAs. CARIFORUM grants any more favourable treatment with "any major trading economy", subject to consultations.
The Parties may deny the MFN treatment contained in the FTA to the EU.
EU -Chile
Limited to products subject to price band in Chile, in RTAs notified under GATT Art. XXIV Only applied by Chile
EU -Côte d'Ivoire
Post signature, the EU grants any more favourable treatment applied in FTAs. Cote d'Ivoire grants any more favourable treatment with "a major trade partner", subject to consultations.
EU -Syria
Applied by Syria only, "subject to the special provisions relating to frontier zone trade".
FTAs, Customs Unions; regional economic integration or developing countries ECO Tariffs, para-tariff, non-tariffs barriers. The third country should be a WTO member and the beneficiary Party should be a non-WTO Member
Only benefits non-WTO Parties to the Agreement
EFTA -Chile
Upon negotiation. For processed agricultural products subject to concessions, EFTA grants treatment no less favourable than that accorded to the EU, based on reviews that can be requested by either party. Any duty reduction granted by the EFTA states to be reciprocated by Chile.
EFTA -Croatia
For industrial products subject to concessions, treatment no less favourable than that accorded to the EU. Only offered by Croatia
EFTA -Egypt
For processed agricultural goods subject to concessions, treatment no less favourable than that accorded to the EU, based on reviews requested by Egypt .
Only offered by EFTA
EFTA -FYROM
For industrial and processed agricultural products subject to concessions, FYROM accords treatment no less favourable than that accorded to the EU. For processed agricultural products EFTA accords treatment no less favourable than that accorded to the EU ( upon request of review).
EFTA -Jordan
For industrial and processed agricultural products subject to concessions, Jordan accords treatment no less favourable than that accorded to the EU. For processed agricultural products EFTA accords treatment no less favourable than that accorded to EU (upon request of review).
EFTA -Korea, Republic of
For processed agricultural products subject to concessions, EFTA offers treatment no less favourable than that accorded to EU on 1 April 2005, based on reviews that can be requested by either party.
Only granted by EFTA
EFTA -Lebanon
For industrial products, in the event Lebanon agrees on accelerated tariff dismantling with the EU, it shall, upon request by EFTA, provide adequate opportunity for negotiations with a view to providing the same treatment.
Only granted by Lebanon
EFTA -Morocco
For processed agricultural products subject to concessions, EFTA and Morocco accord treatment no less favourable than that accorded to the EU (for EFTA, upon request of review).
EFTA -Palestinian Authority
For processed agricultural products subject to concessions, treatment no less favourable than that accorded to the EU, based on reviews that can be requested by either party.
Offered by EFTA only
EFTA -SACU
For processed agricultural products subject to concessions, EFTA grants treatment no less favourable than that accorded to the EU. Only granted by EFTA
EFTA -Singapore
Upon request. If a party concludes an RTA with a non-Party under Art. XXIV, it shall, upon request afford adequate opportunity to negotiate any additional benefits granted therein.
EFTA -Tunisia
Upon request. For industrial and processed agricultural products subject to concessions, Tunisia accords treatment no less favourable than that accorded to the EU. For processed agricultural products subject to concessions, EFTA accords treatment no less favourable than that accorded to the EU or other EFTA states (upon request of review).
EFTA -Turkey
Upon request of a review. For processed agricultural products subject to
RTA Scope and Conditions of Application Exceptions
concessions, the Parties offer treatment no less favourable than that accorded to the EU.
EFTA (Stockholm Convention)
For processed agricultural products, the Parties offer treatment no less favourable than that offered to the EU or to any FTA partner.
Iceland -Faroe Islands
Unconditional application, all goods
India -Nepal
Unconditional application. i) Customs duties and charges, ii) import regulations India -Singapore Post signature to this agreement, upon request and negotiation
Japan -Singapore
Pre and post entry into force, parties to favourably consider offering treatment no less favourable than that offered to a third party.
Lao -Thailand goods
Membership in customs unions, FTAs, regional integration agreements. Melanesian Spearhead Group goods FTAs, customs unions, multilateral commodity agreements. MERCOSURIndia all goods, upon consultation
MERCOSUR
Any advantage, favour, exemption, immunity or privilege ranted to third countries (except members of LAIA) is extended automatically to MERCOSUR.
PICTA goods
Agreements to facilitate frontier traffic, tariff preferences through FTAs or customs unions, multilateral commodity agreements.
SADC all goods
RTAs in force at entry into force of SADC
Turkey -Albania
For industrial products subject to concessions, treatment no less favourable than that accorded to the EU.
Offered by Albania only
TurkeyMontenegro
For industrial products subject to concessions, treatment no less favourable than that accorded to the EU. Offered by Montenegro only
US-Peru
For some agricultural products, Peru offers the United States the lowest tariff rates that Peru provides to such goods pursuant to any preferential trade arrangement signed or modified by Peru after December 2005.
Offered by Peru only
Accession provisions
Provision for a third party to accede to an existing RTA provides an indication of the RTA's openness and the potential for the extension of market access opportunities to acceding parties. In some RTAs, accession is restricted to countries in a certain geographical area or to those acceding to a pre-existing RTA which is itself is a party to an RTA, e.g. EFTA's or ASEAN's RTAs. Of the 192 RTAs surveyed, 61% do not permit the accession of third parties or are silent on the issue, while 38% permit accession. Of those permitting accession, more than half provide for accession of any third party, though often subject to terms and conditions to be agreed upon by the RTA parties. Chart 17 summarizes the results.
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Chart 17: Summary of Accession Provisions in192 RTAs surveyed
No accession Provision 62%
Accession -to any third party 22%
Accessionlimited 16%
K. COMMITMENT TO FURTHER LIBERALIZATION
A number of RTAs contain provisions committing their parties to engage in further liberalization at some point in the future. In some RTAs the specific time period for negotiations is laid down, in others it is not. Sometimes provisions governing future liberalization apply only to specific products such as agricultural products where coverage tends to be lower; in others, a general evolutionary clause commits the parties to consider extending coverage of the agreement to areas not yet covered.
Of the 192 RTAs considered in this study, 59% contain a provision providing for the parties to negotiate further market access or to expand the agreement to areas not already covered by the agreement. In 15 RTAs, the timeframe for negotiations is specified -usually two to five years after the date of entry into force, though in one case the timeframe given is 20 years after the entry into force (for dairy products only). In other RTAs no specific timeframe is laid out.
L. CONCLUSIONS
The negotiation, administration and implementation of RTAs demands considerable resources. A simple measurement of the number of RTAs in which a country engages is not sufficient to determine the complexity of the trading regime it faces. This can be complemented by measuring the number of preferential bilateral relations and the share and evolution of trade that takes place among preferential partners (bearing in mind that preference utilization data are not readily available). Taken together, these measures provide a more accurate picture of the complexity of the preferential trading landscape for individual WTO Members. A sample of the evolution of trade flows for the ten countries most active in RTAs indicates that trade shares with a majority of their preferential trading partners are negligible, thus suggesting that motivations other than a desire to increase market access may account for countries' participation in RTAs. Further work is necessary to explore this observation. The analysis of trade and tariff liberalization at the harmonized HS 6-digit level for 65 RTAs already subject to the TM provides a horizontal overview of liberalization undertaken at both entry into force and the end of the implementation period. Some trends are evident. First, in many RTAs agricultural products are subject to lower and slower liberalization, frequent product exclusions in HS Chapters 1-24, and subject to systematic protection in some countries. Disparities in liberalization strategies are evident in some RTAs, suggesting that liberalization tends to be a negotiated and reciprocated outcome, depending on the partner. Once more RTAs are subject to the TM, these observations can be retested. Products subject to the most frequent exclusions in the 65 RTAs studied are sugar, miscellaneous edible preparations, beverages, cereals, dairy products and meat. An analysis of MFN Page 30
versus remaining dutiable preferential rates shows that tariff peaks remain in place, suggesting that little effort has been made to liberalize such products, even in a preferential context. Analysis of the relative margins of preference in RTAs not (or, not yet) subject to the TM confirms the observation that the liberalization of agricultural products, even in a preferential setting, is sensitive. This suggests that multilateral liberalization of these products may be more difficult.
The study also looked at certain regulatory provisions which have a bearing on market access. Two thirds of the 192 RTAs studied would satisfy the condition in the Understanding to GATT Article XXIV that liberalization should take place within ten years. A transition period of up to 20 years is applied for the other third. In 3% of RTAs, no transition period is stated in the agreement. A survey of those RTAs subject to the TM shows that a longer transition period results in general in greater liberalization of tariff lines. A larger sample size is needed in order to draw firmer conclusions.
The paper examines two issues which may result in the multilateralization of preferences to a wider WTO audience. MFN-type provisions applicable to merchandise trade are found in about 15% of the RTAs studied. Such provisions are rarely unconditional, but are frequently subject to conditions which restrict their scope and application, thus providing little scope for the extension of preferences. Nonetheless, tariff liberalization in a preferential context, albeit with a limited number of partners, may foster a country's willingness to liberalize at a future point either multilaterally, unilaterally, or both. A time series analysis of WTO Members' MFN and preferential rates would allow us to explore this further. Provisions allowing for third-party accession to RTAs are found in about a third of the 192 RTAs studied. Such provisions are, however, frequently conditional on factors such as geographic location, thus limiting the potential to extend membership in RTAs to third parties.
A number of RTAs contain provisions committing their parties to engage in further liberalization or to extend the coverage of the agreement to other regulatory areas. Further study could be undertaken to determine to what extent such provisions have been used and the results achieved. The Transparency Mechanism makes provision for countries participating in RTAs to notify changes to an RTA and to submit an implementation report at the end of the RTA's implementation period. 41 Compliance with these provisions would provide a source of valuable information regarding subsequent liberalization undertaken by RTA parties.
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ANNEX
